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Abstract
We study nonzero-sum hypothesis testing games that arise in the context of adversar-
ial classification, in both the Bayesian as well as the Neyman-Pearson frameworks.
We first show that these games admit mixed strategy Nash equilibria, and then
we examine some interesting concentration phenomena of these equilibria. Our
main results are on the exponential rates of convergence of classification errors
at equilibrium, which are analogous to the well-known Chernoff-Stein lemma
and Chernoff information that describe the error exponents in the classical binary
hypothesis testing problem, but with parameters derived from the adversarial model.
The results are validated through numerical experiments.
1 Introduction
Classification is a simple but important task that has numerous applications in a variety of domains
such as computer vision or security. A traditional assumption that is used in the design of classification
algorithms is that the input data is generated without knowledge of the classifier being used, hence
the data distribution is independent of the classification algorithm. This assumption is no longer valid
in the presence of an adversary, as an adversarial agent can learn the classifier and deliberately alter
the data such that the classifier makes an error. This is the case in particular in security applications
where the classifier’s goal is to detect the presence of an adversary from the data it observes.
Adversarial classification has been studied in two main settings. The first focuses on adversarial
versions of a standard classification task in machine learning, where the adversary attacks the
classifier (defender/decision maker) by directly choosing vectors from a given set of data vectors;
whereas the second focuses on adversarial hypothesis testing, where the adversary (attacker) gets to
choose a distribution from a set of distributions and independent data samples are generated from
this distribution. The main differences of the latter framework from the former are that: (i) the
adversary only gets to choose a distribution (rather than the actual attack vector) and data is generated
independently from this distribution, and (ii) the defender makes a decision only once after it observes
a whole data sequence instead of making a decision for each individual data sample it receives. Both
of these frameworks have applications in a variety of domains, but prior literature has mainly focused
on the first setting; see Section 1.1 for a description of the related literature.
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In this paper, we focus on the setting of adversarial hypothesis testing. To model the interaction
between the attacker and defender, we formulate a nonzero-sum two-player game between the
adversary and the classifier where the adversary picks a distribution from a given set of distributions,
and data is generated independently from that distribution (a non-attacker always generates data from
a fixed distribution). The defender on his side makes a decision based on observation of n data points.
Our model can also be viewed as a game-theoretic extension of the classical binary hypothesis testing
problem where the distribution under the alternate hypothesis is chosen by an adversary. Based on
our game model, we are then able to extend to the adversarial setting the main results of the classical
hypothesis testing problem (see Section 2) on the form of the best decision rule and on the rates of
decrease of classification errors. More specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose nonzero-sum games to model adversarial hypothesis testing problems in a
flexible manner.
2. We show existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which the defender employs certain
likelihood ratio tests similar to that used in the classical binary hypothesis testing problem.
3. We show that the classification errors under all Nash equilibria for our hypothesis testing
games decay exponentially fast in the number of data samples. We analytically obtain these
error exponents, and it turns out that they are same as those arising in certain classical
hypothesis testing problem, with parameters derived from the adversarial model.
4. We illustrate the results, in particular the importance of some assumptions, using simulations.
Throughout our analysis, an important difficulty lies in that the strategy spaces of both the players are
uncountable; we believe, however, that it is an important feature of the model to be realistic.
1.1 Related Work
Adversarial classification and the security of machine learning have been studied extensively in the
past decade, see e.g., [9, 21, 4, 15, 19, 24]; here we focus only on game-theoretic approaches to tackle
the problem. Note that, besides the adversarial learning problem, game theory has been successfully
used to tackle several other security problems such as allocation of monitoring resources to protect
targets, see e.g., [8, 18]. We review here only papers relating to classification.
A number of game-theoretic models have appeared in the past decade to study the adversarial
classification problem in the classical setting of classification tasks in machine learning. [9] studies
the best response in an adversarial classification game, where the adversary is allowed to alter training
data. A number of zero-sum game models were also proposed where the attacker is restricted on the
amount of modifications he can do to the training set, see [17, 31, 30]. [6] studies the problem of
choosing the best linear classifier in the presence of an adversary (a similar model is also studied in
[7]) using a nonzero-sum game, and shows the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Similar to our formulation, the strategy sets in this case are uncountable, and therefore showing the
existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium needs some work. However, in our formulation, there
may not always exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, which makes the subsequent analysis of
error exponents more difficult. [20] studies an adversarial classification game where the utilities of
the players are defined by using ROC curves. The authors study Nash equilibria for their model and
provide numerical discretization techniques to compute the equilibria. [12] studies a nonzero-sum
adversarial classification game where the defender has no restriction on the classifier, but the attacker
is limited to a finite set of vectors. The authors show that the defender can, at equilibrium, use only a
small subset of “threshold classifiers” and characterize the equilibrium through linear programming
techniques. In our model, the utility functions share similarities with that of [12], but we work in
the hypothesis testing framework and with uncountable action sets, which completely modifies the
analysis. Several studies appeared recently on “strategic classification”, where the objective of the
attacker(s) is to improve the classification outcome in his own direction, see [14, 11].
On the other hand, adversarial hypothesis testing has been studied by far fewer authors. [2] studies a
source identification game in the presence of an adversary, where the classifier needs to distinguish
between two source distributions P0 and P1 in which the adversary can corrupt samples from P0
before it reaches the classifier. They show that the game has an asymptotic Nash equilibrium when
the number of samples becomes large, and compute the error exponent associated with the false
negative probability. [3] and [29] study further extensions of this framework.
A (non game-theoretic) hypothesis testing problem in an adversarial setting has been studied by [5],
which is the closest to our work. Here, there are two sets of probability distributions and nature
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outputs a fixed number of independent samples generated by using distributions from either one of
these two sets. The goal of the classifier is to detect the true state of nature. The authors derive error
exponents associated with the classification error, in both Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson frameworks
using a worst-case maxmin analysis. Although we restrict to i.i.d. samples and let the non-attacker
play a single distribution, we believe that our nonzero-sum game model with flexible utilities can
better capture the interaction between adversary and classifier. There also exists extensive prior work
within the statistics literature [16] on minimax hypothesis testing, which relates to our paper, but we
defer a discussion of how our work differs from it to after we have exposed the details of our model.
Game-theoretic models were also used to study adversarial classification in a sequential setting,
see [28, 1, 22], but with very different techniques and results.
2 Basic Setup and Hypothesis Testing Background
In this section, we present the basic setup results in classical binary hypothesis testing.
Throughout the paper, we consider an alphabet set X that we assume finite. In a classical hypothesis
testing problem, we are given two distribution p and q, and a realization of a sequence of independent
and identically distributed random variables X1, . . . , Xn, which are distributed as either p (under
hypothesis H0) or q (under hypothesis H1). Our goal is to distinguish between the two alternatives:
H0 : X1, X2, . . . , Xn i.i.d. ∼ p versus H1 : X1, X2, . . . , Xn i.i.d. ∼ q.
In this setting, we could make two possible types of errors: (i) we declare H1, whereas the true state
of nature is H0 (Type I error, or false alarm), and (ii) we declare H0 whereas the true state of nature
is H1 (Type II error, or missed detection). Note that one can make one of these errors arbitrarily
small at the expense of the other by always declaring H0 or H1.
The trade-off between the two types of errors can be captured using two frameworks. If we have
knowledge on the prior probabilities of the two hypotheses, then we can seek a decision rule that
minimizes the average probability of error (this is the Bayesian framework). On the other hand, if we
do not have any information on the prior probabilities, then we can fix ε > 0 and seek a decision
rule that minimizes the Type II error among all decision rules whose Type I error is at most ε (this
is the Neyman-Pearson framework). In both of these frameworks, it can be shown that the optimal
test is a likelihood ratio test, i.e., given xn = (x1, . . . , xn) we compute the likelihood ratio
q(xn)
p(xn)
and compare it to a threshold to make a decision (with possible randomization at the boundary in
the Neyman-Pearson framework). Here, p(xn) (resp. q(xn)) denotes the probability of observing
the n-length word xn under the distribution p (resp. q). See Section II.B and II.D in [25] for an
introduction to hypothesis testing.
For large enough n, by the law of large numbers, the fraction of i in an observation xn is very close
to p(i) (resp. q(i)) under H0 (resp. under H1), for each i ∈ X . Therefore, one anticipates that the
probability of correct decision is very close to 1 for large enough n. Hence, one can study the rate
at which the errors go to 0 as n becomes large. It is shown that, under both frameworks, the error
decays exponentially in n. In the Bayesian framework, the error exponent associated with the average
probability of error is −Λ∗0(0), where Λ∗0(·) is the Fenchel-Legendre transform of the log-moment
generating function of the random variable q(X)p(X) underH0, i.e., whenX ∼ p. In the Neyman-Pearson
case, the error exponent associated with the Type II error is −D(p||q) where D is the relative entropy
functional. The above error exponents are known as Chernoff information and Chernoff-Stein lemma,
respectively (see Section 3.4 in [10] for the analysis on error exponents).
In this work, we propose extensions of the classical hypothesis testing framework to an adversarial
scenario modeled as a game, both in the Bayesian and in the Neyman-Pearson frameworks; and we
investigate how the corresponding results are modified. Due to space constraints, we present only
the model and results for the Bayesian framework in the main body of the paper. The corresponding
analysis for the Neyman-Pearson framework follows similar ideas and is relegated to Appendix A.
The proofs of all results presented in the paper (and in Appendix A) can be found in Appendix B.
3
3 Hypothesis Testing Game in the Bayesian Framework
In this section, we formulate a one-shot adversarial hypothesis testing game in the Bayesian frame-
work, motivated by security problems where there might be an attacker who modifies the data
distribution and a defender who tries to detect the presence of the attacker. Game theoretic modelling
of such problems has found great success in understanding the behavior of the agents via equilibrium
analysis in many applications, see Section 1.1. We first present the model and then elaborate on its
motivations and on how it relates to related works in statistics.
3.1 Problem Formulation
Let X = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} denote the alphabet set with cardinality d, and let M1(X ) denote the
space of probability distributions on X . Fix n ≥ 1.
The game is played as follows. There are two players: the external agent and the defender. The
external agent can either be a non-attacker or an attacker. In the Bayesian framework, we assume that
the external agent is an attacker with probability θ, and a non-attacker (normal user) with probability
1− θ. The non-attacker is not strategic and she does not have any adversarial objective. If the external
agent is a non-attacker, she generates n samples independently from the distribution p. If the external
agent is an attacker, she picks a distribution q from a set of distributions Q ⊆M1(X ) and generates
n samples independently from q. The defender, upon observing the n-length word generated by the
external agent, wants to detect the presence of the attacker.
Throughout the paper, a decision rule implemented by the defender is denoted by ϕ : Xn → [0, 1],
with the interpretation that ϕ(xn) is the probability with which hypothesis H1 is accepted (i.e.,
the presence of an adversary is declared) when the defender observes the n-length word xn =
(x1, . . . , xn). We say that a decision rule ϕ is deterministic if ϕ(xn) ∈ {0, 1} for all xn ∈ Xn.
To define the game, let the attacker’s strategy set be Q ⊆M1(X ), and that of the defender be
Φn = {ϕ : Xn → [0, 1]},
which is the set of all randomized decision rules on n-length words.
To define the utilities, consider the attacker first. We assume that there is a cost associated with
choosing a distribution from Q which we model using a cost function c : Q→ R+. The goal of the
attacker is to fool the defender as much as possible, i.e., he wants to maximize the probability that the
defender classifies an n-length word as coming from the non-attacker whereas it is actually being
generated by the attacker. To capture this, the utility of the attacker when she plays the pure strategy
q ∈ Q and the defender plays the pure strategy ϕ ∈ Φn is defined as
uAn (q, ϕ) =
∑
xn
(1− ϕ(xn))q(xn)− c(q), (3.1)
where q(xn) denotes the probability of observing the n-length word xn when the symbols are
generated independently from the distribution q.
For the defender, the goal is to minimize the classification error. Similar to the classical hypothesis
testing problem, there could be two types of errors: (i) the external agent is actually a non-attacker
whereas the defender declares that there is an attack (Type I error, or false alarm), and (ii) the external
agent is an attacker whereas the defender declares that there is no attack (Type II error, or missed
detection). The goal of the defender is to minimize a weighted sum of the above two types of errors.
After suitable normalization, we define the utility of the defender as
uDn (q, ϕ) = −
(∑
xn
(1− ϕ(xn))q(xn) + γ
∑
xn
ϕ(xn)p(xn)
)
, (3.2)
where γ > 0 is a constant that captures the exogenous probability of attack (i.e., θ), as well as the
relative weights given to the error terms.
We denote our Bayesian hypothesis testing game with utility functions (3.1) and (3.2) by GB(d, n).
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by uAn (σ
A
n , σ
D
n ) and u
D
n (σ
A
n , σ
D
n ), the utility of the players
under a mixed strategy (σAn , σ
D
n ), where σ
A
n ∈M1(Q), and σDn ∈M1(Φn).
For our analysis of game GB(d, n), we will make use of the following assumptions:
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(A1) Q is a closed subset of M1(X ), and p /∈ Q.
(A2) p(i) > 0 for all i ∈ X . Furthermore, for each q ∈ Q, q(i) > 0 for all i ∈ X .
(A3) c is continuous on Q, and there exists a unique q∗ ∈ Q such that
q∗ = arg min
q∈Q
c(q).
(A4) The point p is distant from the set Q relative to the point q∗, i.e.,
{µ ∈M1(X ) : D(µ||p) ≤ D(µ||q∗)} ∩Q = ∅,
where D(µ||ν) = ∑i∈X µ(i) log µ(i)ν(i) , µ, ν ∈M1(X ), denotes the relative entropy between
the distributions µ and ν.
Note that (A1) and (A2) are very natural. In (A2), if p(i) = 0 for some i ∈ X and q(i) > 0 for some
q ∈ Q, then the adversary will never pick q, as the defender can easily detect the presence of the
attacker by looking for element i. On the other hand, if p(i) = 0 and q(i) = 0 for all q ∈ Q, we
may consider a new alphabet set without i. In (A3), continuity of the cost function c is natural and
we do not assume any extra condition other than the requirement that there is a unique minimizer.
Assumption (A4) is used to show certain property of the equilibrium of the defender, which is later
used in the study of error exponents associated with classification error. Specifically, Assumption (A4)
is used in the proofs of Lemma 4.4, Lemma 4.5 and Theorem 4.1; all other results are valid without
this assumption. We will further discuss the role of (A3) and (A4) in Section 4.3 after Theorem 4.1.
3.2 Model discussion
Our setting is that of adversarial hypothesis testing, where the attacker chooses a distribution and
points are then generated i.i.d. according to it. This is a reasonable model in applications such
as multimedia forensics (where one tries to determine if an attacker has tampered with an image
from signals that can be modeled as random variables following an image-dependent distribution) or
biometrics (where again one tries to detect from random signals whether the perceived signals do
come from the characteristics of a given individual or they come from tampered characteristics)—see
more details about these applications in [2, 3, 29]. In such applications, it is reasonable that different
ways of tampering have different costs for the attacker and that one can estimate those costs for a
given application at least to some extent. Modeling the attacker’s utility via a cost function is classical
in other settings, for instance in adversarial classification [12, 28, 6] and experiments with real-world
applications where a reasonable cost function can be estimated has been done, for instance, in [6].
Our setting is very similar to that of a composite hypothesis testing framework where nature picks a
distribution from a given set and generates independent samples from it. However, in such problems,
one does not model a utility function for the nature/statistician and one is often interested in existence
and properties of uniformly most powerful test or locally most powerful test (depending on the
Bayesian or frequentist approach; see Section II.E in [25]). In contrast, here, we specifically model
the utility functions for the agents and investigate the behavior at Nash equilibrium using very
different analysis, which is more natural in adversarial settings where two rational agents interact.
Our setting also coincides with the well-studied setting of minimax testing [16] when c(q) = 0 for
all q ∈ Q (and hence every q is a minimizer of c). Note, however, that this case is not included in
our model due to Assumption (A3)—rather we study the opposite extreme where c has a unique
minimizer. Our results are not an easy extension of the classical results because our game is now a
nonzero-sum game (whereas the minimax setting corresponds to a zero-sum game). We can therefore
not inherit any of the nice properties of zero-sum games; in particular we cannot compute the NE and
we instead have to prove properties of the NE (e.g., concentration) without being able to explicitly
compute it. In fact, our results too are quite different since we show that the error rate is the same as
a simple test where H1 would contain only q∗, which is different from the classical minimax case.
Finally, in our model we fix the sample size n, i.e., the defender makes a decision only after
observing all n samples. We restrict to this simpler setting since it has applications in various domains
(see Section 1.1), and understanding the equilibrium of such games leads to interesting and non-trivial
results. We leave the study of a sequential model where the defender has the flexibility to choose the
number of samples for decision making as future work.
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4 Main Results
4.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for GB(d, n)
We first examine the Nash equilibrium for GB(d, n). Note that the strategy sets of both the attacker and
the defender are uncountable, hence it is a priori not clear whether our game has a Nash equilibrium.
Towards this, we equip the set Φn of all randomized decision rules with the sup-norm metric, i.e.,
dn(ϕ1, ϕ2) = max
xn∈Xn
|ϕ1(xn)− ϕ2(xn)|,
for ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Φn. It is easy to see that the set Φn endowed with the above metric is a compact
metric space. We also equip M1(X ) with the usual Euclidean topology on Rd, and equip Q with the
subspace topology. Also, for studying the mixed extension of the game, we equip the spaces M1(Q)
and M1(Φn) with their corresponding weak topologies. Product spaces are always equipped with the
corresponding product topology.
We begin with a simple continuity property of the utility functions.
Lemma 4.1. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then, the utility functions uAn and uDn are continuous on Q× Φn.
We now show the main result of this subsection, namely existence and partial characterization of a
NE for our hypothesis testing game.
Proposition 4.1. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for
GB(d, n). If (σˆAn , σˆDn ) is a NE, then so is (σˆAn , ϕˆn) where ϕˆn is the likelihood ratio test given by
ϕˆn(x
n) =

1, if qσˆAn (x
n)− γp(xn) > 0,
ϕσˆDn , if qσˆAn (x
n)− γp(xn) = 0,
0, if qσˆAn (x
n)− γp(xn) < 0,
(4.1)
where qσˆAn (x
n) =
∫
q(xn)σˆAn (dq), and ϕσˆDn =
∫
ϕ(xn)σˆDn (dϕ).
The existence of a NE follows from Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem (see e.g., Corollary 2.4 in [26]);
for the form of the defender’s equilibrium strategy, we have to examine the utility function uDn .
Remark 4.1. Note that we have considered randomization over Φn to show existence of a NE. Once
this is established, we can then show the form of the strategy of the defender ϕˆn at equilibrium; the
existence of a NE is not clear if we do not consider randomization over Φn.
Remark 4.2. Note that the distribution qσˆAn on Xn cannot necessarily be written as an n-fold product
distribution of some element from M1(X ). Therefore, the test ϕˆn is slightly different from the
usual likelihood ratio test that appears in the classical hypothesis testing problem where samples are
generated independently.
Remark 4.3. Apart from the conditions of the above proposition, a sufficient condition for existence
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is that the utilities are individually quasiconcave, i.e., uAn (·, ϕ) is
quasiconcave for all ϕ ∈ Φn, and uDn (q, ·) is quasiconcave for all q ∈ Q. However, it is easy to check
that the Type II error term is not quasiconcave in the attacker’s strategy, and hence the utility of the
attacker is not quasiconcave. Hence, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist—see
numerical experiments in Appendix A.
Remark 4.4. Proposition 4.1 does not provide any information about the structure of the attacker’s
strategy at a NE. We believe that obtaining the complete structure of a NE and computing it is a
difficult problem in general because the strategy spaces of both players are uncountable (and there is
no pure-strategy NE in general), and we cannot use the standard techniques for finite games. However,
we emphasize that we are able to obtain error exponents at an equilibrium (see Theorem 4.1) without
explicitly computing the structure of a NE. Also, one could study Stackelberg equilibrium for our
game GB(d, n) to help solve computational issues, although we note that most of the security games
literature using Stackelberg games assumes finite action spaces (see, for example, [18]); however we
do not address the study of Stackelberg equilibrium in this paper.
4.2 Concentration Properties of Equilibrium
We now study some concentration properties of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the game
GB(d, n) for large n. The results in this section will be used later to show the exponential convergence
of the classification error at equilibrium.
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Let en denote the classification error, i.e., en(q, ϕ) = −uDn (q, ϕ), q ∈ Q,ϕ ∈ Φn. We begin with
the following lemma, which asserts that the error at equilibrium is small for large enough n.
Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1)-(A3). Let (σˆAn , σˆDn )n≥1 be a sequence such that, for each n ≥ 1, (σˆAn , σˆDn )
is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for GB(d, n). Then, en(σˆAn , σˆDn )→ 0 as n→∞.
The main idea in the proof is to let the defender play a decision rule whose acceptance set is a small
neighborhood around the point p, and then bound en(σˆAn , σˆ
D
n ) using the error of the above strategy.
We now show that the mixed strategy profile of the attacker σˆAn converges weakly to the point mass at
q∗ (denoted by δq∗) as n→∞. This is a consequence of the fact that q∗ is the minimizer of c, and
hence for large enough n, the attacker does not gain much by deviating from the point q∗.
Lemma 4.3. Assume (A1)-(A3), and let (σˆAn , σˆDn )n≥1 be as in Lemma 4.2. Then, σˆAn → δq∗ weakly
as n→∞.
Note that it is not clear from the above lemma that the equilibrium strategy of the attacker σˆAn is
supported on a small neighborhood around q∗ for large enough n. By playing a strategy q that is far
from q∗ we could still have uAn (q, σˆ
D
n ) = u
A
n (σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ), since the error term in u
A
n could compensate
for the possible loss of utility from the cost term. We now proceed to show that this cannot happen
under Assumption (A4). We first argue that the equilibrium error is small even when the attacker
deviates from her equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 4.4. Assume (A1)-(A4), and let (σˆAn , σˆDn )n≥1 be as in Lemma 4.2. Then,
sup
q∈Q
en(q, σˆ
D
n )→ 0 as n→∞.
We are now ready to show the concentration of the attacker’s equilibrium:
Lemma 4.5. Assume (A1)-(A4), and let (σˆAn , σˆDn )n≥1 be as in Lemma 4.2. Let (qn)n≥1 be a sequence
such that qn ∈ supp(σˆAn ) for each n ≥ 1. Then, qn → q∗ as n→∞.
The above concentration phenomenon is a consequence of the uniqueness of q∗ and Assumption (A4).
The main idea in the proofs of Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 is to essentially show that, for large enough
n, the acceptance region of H0 under (any) mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does not intersect the set
Q. If we do not assume (A4), then the decision region at equilibrium could intersect Q, and we may
not have the concentration property in the above lemma (we will still have the convergence property
in Lemma 4.3 though, which does not use (A4)).
4.3 Error Exponents
With the results on concentration properties of the equilibrium from the previous section, we are
now ready to examine the error exponent associated with the classification error at equilibrium. Let
Λ0 denote the log-moment generating function of the random variable
q∗(X)
p(X) under H0, i.e., when
X ∼ p: Λ0(λ)=log
∑
i∈X exp
(
λ q
∗(i)
p(i)
)
p(i), λ ∈ R. Define its Fenchel-Legendre transform
Λ∗0(x) = sup
λ∈R
{λx− Λ0(λ)}, x ∈ R.
Our main result in the paper (for the Bayesian case) is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Assume (A1)-(A4), and let (σˆAn , σˆDn )n≥1 be as in Lemma 4.2. Then,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) = −Λ∗0(0).
Our approach to show this result is via obtaining asymptotic lower and upper bounds for the classifi-
cation error at equilibrium en(σˆAn , σˆ
D
n ). Since we do not have much information about the structure
of the equilibrium, we first let one of the players deviate from their equilibrium strategy, so that we
can estimate the error corresponding to the new pair of strategies, and then use these estimates to
compute the error rate at equilibrium. The lower bound easily follows by letting the attacker play the
strategy q∗, and using the error exponent in the classical hypothesis testing problem between p and
q∗. For the upper bound, we let the defender play a specific deterministic decision rule, and make use
of the concentration properties of the equilibrium of the attacker in Section 4.2.
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Thus, we see that the error exponent is the same as that for the classical hypothesis testing problem of
X1, . . . , Xn i.i.d.∼ p versus X1, . . . , Xn i.i.d.∼ q∗ (see Corollary 3.4.6 in [10]). That is, for large
values of n, the adversarial hypothesis testing game is not much different from the above classical
setting (whose parameters are derived from the adversarial setting) in terms of classification error.
We emphasize that we have not used any property of the specific structure of the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium in obtaining the error exponent associated with the classification error, and hence
Theorem 4.1 is valid for any NE. We believe that obtaining the actual structure of a NE is a difficult
problem, as the strategy spaces are infinite, and the utility functions do not possess any monotonicity
properties in general. For numerical computation of error exponents in a simple case, see Section 5.
We conclude this section by discussing the role of Assumptions (A3) and (A4). We used (A4) to obtain
the concentration of equilibrium in Lemma 4.5. Without this assumption, Theorem 4.1 is not valid; see
Section 5 for numerical counter-examples. Also, in our setting, unlike the classical minimax testing,
it is not clear whether it is always true that the error goes to 0 as the number of samples becomes
large, and whether the attacker should always play a point close to q∗ at equilibrium. It could be that
playing a point far from q∗ is better if she can compensate the loss from c from the error term. In fact,
that is what happens when (A4) is not satisfied, since there is partial overlap of the decision region of
the defender with the set Q. Regarding (A3), when c has multiple minimizers, our analysis can only
tell us that the equilibrium of the attacker is supported around the set of minimizers for large enough
n; to study error exponents in such cases, one has to do a finer analysis of characterizing the attacker’s
equilibrium. All in all, using (A3) and (A4) allows us to establish interesting concentration properties
of the equilibrium (which is not a priori clear) and error exponents associated with classification error
without characterizing a NE, hence we believe that these assumptions serve as a good starting point.
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we present two numerical examples in the Bayesian formulation to illustrate the
result in Theorem 4.1 and the importance of Assumption (A4). Due to space limitations, additional
experiments in the Bayesian formulation are relegated to Appendix C, which illustrate (a) best
response strategies of the players, (b) existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for large values on
n as suggested by Lemma 4.5, and (c) importance of Assumption (A4).1
We illustrate the result in Theorem 4.1 numerically in the following setting. We fix X = {0, 1} (i.e.
d = 2) and each probability distribution on X is represented by the probability that it assigns to the
symbol 1, and hence M1(X ) is viewed as the unit interval. We fix p = 0.5. For numerical compu-
tations, we discretize the set Q into 100 equally spaced points, and we only consider deterministic
threshold-based decision rules for the defender. To compute a NE, we solve the linear programs
associated with attacker as well as the defender for the zero-sum equivalent game of GB(2, n).
For the function c(q) = |q − q∗| with q∗ = 0.8, Figure 1(a) shows the error exponent at the
NE computed by the above procedure as a function of the number of samples, from n = 10 to
n = 300 in steps of 10. As suggested by Theorem 4.1, we see that the error exponents approach
the value Λ∗0(0) = 0.054 (the boundary of the decision region is around the point q = 0.66, and
D(q||p) ≈ D(q||q∗) ≈ 0.054).
We now consider an example which demonstrates that, the result on error exponent in Theorem 4.1
may not be valid if Assumption (A4) is not satisfied. In this experiment, we consider the case
where Q = [0.6, 0.9] and q∗ = 0.9. Note that the present setting does not satisfy Assumption (A4).
Figure 1(b) shows the error exponent at the equilibrium as a function of n, from n = 100 to n = 400
in steps of 100, for the cost function c(q) = 3|q− q∗|. From this plot, we see that, the error exponents
converge to somewhere around 0.032, whereas Λ∗0(0) ≈ 0.111.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied hypothesis testing games that arise in the context of adversarial classification.
We showed that, at equilibrium, the strategy of the classifier is to use a likelihood ratio test. We also
1Appendix C also contains numerical experiments in the Neyman-Pearson formulation presented in Ap-
pendix A. The code used for our simulations is available at https://github.com/sarath1789/ahtg_
neurips2019.
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(a) Q = [0.7, 0.9], c(q) = |q − 0.8| (b) Q = [0.6, 0.9], c(q) = 3|q − 0.9|
Figure 1: Error exponents as a function of n
examined the exponential rate of decay of classification error at equilibrium and showed that it is
same as that of a classical testing problem with parameters derived from the adversarial model.
Throughout the paper, we assumed that the alphabet X is finite. This is a reasonable assumption
in applications that deal with digital signals such as image forensics (an important application for
adversarial hypothesis testing); and it is also a good starting point because even in this case, our
analysis of the error exponents is nontrivial. Making X countable/uncountable will make the space
M1(X ) infinite dimensional, and the analysis of error exponents will become more difficult (e.g., the
continuity of relative entropy is no longer true in this case, which we crucially use in our analysis),
but the case of general state space X is an interesting future direction.
Finding the exact structure of the equilibrium for our hypothesis testing games is a challenging
future direction. This will also shed some light on the error exponent analysis for the case when
Assumption (A4) is not satisfied. Another interesting future direction is to examine the hypothesis
testing game in the sequential detection context where the defender can also decide the number of
data samples for classification. In such a setting, an important question is to understand whether the
optimal strategy of the classifier is to use a standard sequential probability ratio test.
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A Hypothesis Testing Game: Neyman-Pearson Formulation
In this section, we study the Neyman-Pearson version of the hypothesis testing problem. The presentation of
results in this section is similar to the Bayesian case, and we will also use the same notation as in the Bayesian
formulation.
A.1 Problem Formulation
In the Neyman-Pearson point of view, we do not assume any knowledge on the probability that the external agent
is an attacker. Fix ε > 0. As before, the strategy set of the attacker is the set Q. For the defender, motivated by
the Neyman-Pearson approach for the classical hypothesis testing problem, we define the strategy set as the set
of all randomized decision rules on n-length words whose false alarm probability is at most ε, i.e.,
Φn = {ϕ : Xn → [0, 1] : PFAn (ϕ) ≤ ε},
where PFAn (ϕ) =
∑
xn ϕ(x
n)p(xn) denotes the false alarm probability under the decision rule ϕ.
We now define the utilities. Similar to the Bayesian framework, the utility of the attacker is defined as
uAn (q, ϕ) =
∑
xn
(1− ϕ(xn))q(xn)− c(q). (A.1)
Since we have already constrained the strategy set of the defender by imposing an upper bound on the Type I
error, the utility of the defender is defined as
uDn (q, ϕ) = −
(∑
xn
(1− ϕ(xn))q(xn)
)
, (A.2)
which captures the Type II error.
We denote our two-player Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing game with utility functions (A.1) and (A.2) by
GNP (ε, d, n). Similar to the Bayesian case, we will use Assumptions (A1)-(A4) throughout the analysis of the
Neyman-Pearson case.
A.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for GNP (ε, d, n)
We now examine the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the game GNP (ε, d, n). Similar to the Bayesian
framework, we endow the set Q with the standard Euclidean topology on Rd and the set Φn with the sup-norm
metric. The following lemma asserts compactness of the strategy space of the defender.
Lemma A.1. The set Φn equipped with the metric dn is a compact metric space.
We also have joint continuity of the utility functions of both the players, and it can be proved similar to
Lemma 4.1.
Lemma A.2. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then, the utility functions uAn and uDd are continuous on Q× Φn.
We are now ready to show the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition A.1. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for GNP (ε, d, n).
If (σˆAn , σˆ
D
n ) is a NE, then σˆ
D
n is the point mass at the most powerful ε-level Neyman-Pearson test for
X1, . . . , Xn i.i.d. ∼ p versus (X1, . . . , Xn) ∼ qσˆAn .
The existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium easily follows from the compactness of strategy spaces and
continuity of utility functions. To show the specific form of defender’s equilibrium strategy, we appeal to the
Neyman-Pearson lemma.
Let (σˆAn , ϕˆn) denote a NE given by Proposition A.1.
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A.3 Characterization of Equilibrium in the Binary case
Consider the game GNP (ε, d, n) in the binary case, i.e., d = 2. Here, there are some interesting monotonicity
properties of the utility functions that allow us to get a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for GNP (ε, 2, n), in
which the defender plays a threshold-based test, i.e., declares the presence of an adversary whenever the number
of 1’s in the observation exceeds a threshold:
Lemma A.3. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then, the defender admits a strictly dominant strategy, and there exists a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium for GNP (ε, 2, n).
Remark A.1. The monotonicity alluded to above is a consequence of the fact that uDn captures just the Type II
error. In the Bayesian framework, we do not have this monotonicity in uDn , due to the presence of both the Type
I and Type II errors in uDn , and hence, existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the binary case cannot be
guaranteed in the Bayesian framework.
A.4 Concentration Properties of Equilibrium
In this section, we study some concentration properties of the equilibrium. We have the following two lemmas,
which can be proved similar to the corresponding Lemmas for the Bayesian formulation in Section 4.2.
Lemma A.4. Assume (A1)-(A3). Let (σˆAn , ϕˆn)n≥1 be a sequence such that, for each n ≥ 1, (σˆAn , ϕˆn) is a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for GNP (ε, d, n). Then, en(σˆAn , ϕˆn)→ 0 as n→∞.
Lemma A.5. Assume (A1)-(A3), and let (σˆAn , ϕˆn)n≥1 be as in Lemma A.4. Then σˆAn → δq∗ weakly as n→∞.
We also have that the error at equilibrium goes to 0 even when the attacker deviates from her equilibrium strategy.
Lemma A.6. Assume (A1)-(A4), and let (σˆAn , ϕˆn)n≥1 be as in Lemma A.4. Then,
sup
q∈Q
en(q, ϕˆn)→ 0 as n→∞.
The main idea in the proof of the above lemma is to show that the acceptance region ofH0 under any equilibrium
does not intersect the set Q. With this lemma at hand, we now have the following concentration property for the
support of the equilibrium strategy of the attacker, which can be proved similar to Lemma 4.5 in the Bayesian
formulation.
Lemma A.7. Assume (A1)-(A4), and let (σˆAn , ϕˆn)n≥1 be as in Lemma A.4. Let (qn)n≥1 be a sequence such
that qn ∈ supp(σˆAn ) for each n ≥ 1. Then, qn → q∗ as n→∞.
Remark A.2. Note that, in one dimension (d = 1), the acceptance region of an optimal Neyman-Pearson test
for a fixed alternative q will be a “vanishingly small neighborhood of the null distribution p” and that while it
can still intersect Q for finite n, it may not for large-enough n; so that Lemma A.6 may always hold. However,
it is unclear how this might generalize to higher dimension. Intuitively, in higher dimension, the acceptance
region may become close to p only from certain directions. We also note that our proof of Lemma A.6 actually
uses Assumption (A4) and not a weaker version of it—see the expression of Γn in the proof of Lemma A.6.
Therefore, we believe that (A4) is needed in higher dimensions even for the Neyman-Pearson case; although it is
possible that a weaker assumption will suffice in one dimension.
A.5 Error Exponents
Our main result in the Neyman-Pearson formulation is the following theorem.
Theorem A.1. Assume (A1)-(A4), and let (σˆAn , ϕˆn)n≥1 be as in Lemma A.4. Then,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , ϕˆn) = −D(p||q∗).
Again, we note that the error exponent is the same as that of the classical Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing
problem between p and q∗.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Since we are on a metric space, it suffices to show sequential continuity. Let {(qk, ϕk), k ≥ 1} be a sequence
such that (qk, ϕk)→ (q, ϕ) as k →∞. First, consider uDn . Notice that, for each xn, we have qk(xn)→ q(xn),
and ϕk(xn)→ ϕ(xn) as k →∞. Therefore, we have that qk(xn)ϕk(xn)→ q(xn)ϕ(xn), which yields that,
lim
k→∞
∑
xn
qk(x
n)ϕk(x
n) =
∑
xn
q(xn)ϕ(xn).
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Similarly, we also have
lim
k→∞
∑
xn
p(xn)ϕk(x
n) =
∑
xn
p(xn)ϕ(xn).
Therefore, we have that uDn (qk, ϕk) → uDn (q, ϕ) as k → ∞ which proves continuity of the utility of the
defender. Using similar arguments, and by using the continuity of the cost function c on Q, we see that
uAn (qk, ϕk)→ uAn (q, ϕ) as k →∞, which shows the continuity of the utility of the attacker.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
GB(d, n) is a two-player game with compact strategy spaces. Also, by Lemma 4.1, the utilities (in pure
strategies) of both the attacker and the defender are jointly continuous on Q× Φn. Therefore, an application
of the Glicksberg fixed point theorem (see, for example, Corollary 2.4 in [26]) tell us that there exists a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) for the adversarial hypothesis testing game GB(d, n).
We now show the structure of the equilibrium strategy of the defender. Note that, for any ϕ ∈ Φn,
uDn (σˆ
A
n , ϕ) = −1 +
∑
xn ϕ(x
n)(qσˆAn (x
n)− γp(xn)), where qσˆAn (x
n) =
∫
q(xn)σˆAn (dq). Therefore, using
the characterization of a NE (see Proposition 140.1 in [23]), it follows that for any ϕ ∈ supp(σˆDn ), we have
ϕ(xn) =
{
1, if qσˆAn (x
n)− γp(xn) > 0,
0, if qσˆAn (x
n)− γp(xn) < 0.
Now, define ϕˆn such that ϕˆn(xn) =
∫
ϕ(xn)σˆDn (dϕ) whenever xn is such that qσˆAn (x
n) − γp(xn) = 0,
and that satisfies the above condition when xn is such that qσˆAn (x
n) − γp(xn) 6= 0. Consider the strategy
profile (σˆAn , ϕˆn) where the defender plays the pure strategy ϕˆn. By the choice of ϕˆn, we see that uAn (q, ϕˆn) =
uAn (q, σˆ
D
n ) for all q ∈ Q, and uDn (σˆAn , ϕ) ≤ uDn (σˆAn , ϕˆn) for any ϕ ∈ Φn. Therefore, using the characterization
of a NE, we see that (σˆAn , ϕˆn) is a NE. This completes the proof of the Proposition.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
By Assumption (A1), there exist a δ > 0 such that B(p, δ) ∩Q = ∅, where B(p, δ) denotes an open ball of
radius δ centered at p. Let ϕδ denote the deterministic decision rule whose rejection region is the set B(p, δ)c,
i.e., ϕδ(xn) = 1 whenever Pxn ∈ B(p, δ)c and ϕδ(xn) = 0 otherwise, where Pxn ∈ M1(X ) denotes
the type of xn, i.e., Pxn(i) = 1n
∑n
k=1 1{xk=i}. Since (σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) is a Nash equilibrium, and en(σˆAn , σˆDn ) =
−uDn (σˆAn , σˆDn ), we see that
en(σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) ≤ en(σˆAn , ϕδ), (B.1)
where (σˆAn , ϕδ) denotes the strategy profile where the attacker plays the mixed strategy σˆAn and the defender
plays the pure strategy ϕδ .
We now proceed to bound the error term en(σˆAn , ϕδ). We have
en(σˆ
A
n , ϕ
δ) =
∫ [∑
xn
(1− ϕδ(xn))q(xn) + γϕδ(xn)p(xn)
]
σˆAn (dq)
=
∫
q(Pxn ∈ B(p, δ))σˆAn (dq) + γp(Pxn ∈ B(p, δ)c).
We bound the first term above using a simple upper bound for the probability of observing a given type under a
given distribution (see, for example, Lemma 2.1.9 in [10]). Let Pn denote the set of all possible types of an
n-length word. For any q ∈ Q, we have that
q(Pxn ∈ B(p, δ)) ≤
∑
ν∈B(p,δ)∩Pn
e−nD(ν||q)
≤ |B(p, δ) ∩ Pn| e−n infν∈B(p,δ) D(ν||q)
≤ (n+ 1)d e−n infν∈B(p,δ),q∈QD(ν||q),
where the last inequality follows since |Pn| ≤ (n+ 1)d. Therefore,
en(σˆ
A
n , ϕ
δ) ≤(n+ 1)d e−n infν∈B(p,δ),q∈QD(ν||q) + γp(Pxn ∈ B(p, δ)c).
The first term above goes to 0 as n→∞, since infν∈B(p,δ),q∈QD(ν||q) > 0. Also, by the weak law of large
numbers, we see that Pxn converges to p in probability under the null hypothesis H0. Therefore,
p(Pxn ∈ B(p, δ)c)→ 0.
Hence, we conclude that en(σˆAn , ϕδ)→ 0 as n→∞. Combining this with (B.1) completes the proof of the
Lemma.
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B.4 Proof of Lemma 4.3
From Lemma 4.2, we have en(σˆAn , σˆDn )→ 0 as n→∞. Since uAn (q∗, σˆDn ) ≥ −c(q∗) and since (σˆAn , σˆDn ) is a
NE for all n ≥ 1, it follows that ∫
c(q)σˆAn (dq)→ c(q∗)
as n → ∞. Since (σˆAn )n≥1 is a sequence of probability measures on the compact space Q, by Prohorov’s
theorem (see Theorem 1, Section 2 in Chapter 3 of [27]), there exists a weakly convergent subsequence (say
(nk)k≥1). Let µ denote the weak limit of (σˆAnk )k≥1. Then, we have,
c(q∗) = lim
k→∞
∫
c(q)σˆAnk (dq)
=
∫
c(q)µ(dq), (B.2)
where the last equality follows from weak convergence.
We now claim that µ = δq∗ . Suppose not. Then, there exists ε > 0 such that µ(B(q∗, ε)c) > 0. By
Assumption (A3), for the above ε, there exists a δ > 0 such that c(q) > c(q∗) + δ whenever q ∈ B(q∗, ε)c.
Therefore, ∫
Q
c(q)µ(dq) =
∫
B(q∗,ε)
c(q)µ(dq) +
∫
B(q∗,ε)c
c(q)µ(dq)
≥ c(q∗)µ(B(q∗, ε)) + (c(q∗) + δ)µ(B(q∗, ε)c)
= c(q∗) + δµ(B(q∗, ε)c)
> c(q∗),
which contradicts (B.2). Therefore, it follows that µ(B(q∗, ε)c) = 0 for every ε > 0 and hence µ = δq∗ . Since
µ is independent of the subsequence (nk)k≥1, it follows that the whole sequence (σˆAn )n≥1 converges to δq∗
(see Lemma 1, Section 3 in Chapter 3 of [27]). This completes the proof of the lemma.
To prove Lemma 4.4, we need the following lemma, which asserts uniform convergence of integrals of the
relative entropy functional w.r.t. the equilibrium strategy of the attacker.
Lemma B.1. Let (σˆAn , σˆDn )n≥1 be as in Lemma 4.2. Then,
sup
µ∈M1(X )
∣∣∣∣∫ D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq)−D(µ||q∗)∣∣∣∣→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. Fix ε > 0 and µ ∈ M1(X ). Then, using the uniform continuity of the relative entropy function on
M1(X )×Q, there exists δ > 0 such that
sup
q∈Q
|D(µ||q)−D(µ′||q)| < ε for all µ′ ∈ B(µ, δ).
Therefore, for all µ′ ∈ B(µ, δ), we have∣∣∣∣∫ D(µ′||q)σˆAn (dq)− ∫ D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ |D(µ′||q)−D(µ||q)|σˆAn (dq)
≤ ε, for all n ≥ 1.
Also, using weak convergence of (σˆAn )n≥1 to the point mass at q∗, there exists Nµ ≥ 1 such that∣∣∣∣∫ D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq)−D(µ||q∗)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε for all n ≥ Nµ.
Note that, the sets B(µ, δ)µ∈Q is an open cover for M1(X ). By compactness of the space M1(X ), extract a
finite subcover B(µi, δ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Put N = max{Nµ1 , . . . , Nµk}. Then, for all n ≥ N , we have∣∣∣∣∫ D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq)−D(µ||q∗)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫ D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq)− ∫ D(µi||q)σˆAn (dq)∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣∫ D(µi||q)σˆAn (dq)−D(µi||q∗)∣∣∣∣+
|D(µi||q∗)−D(µ||q∗)|
≤ 3ε,
where µi is such that µ ∈ B(µi, δ). The result now follows since ε and µ are arbitrary.
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B.5 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Recall the decision rule ϕˆn from Proposition 4.1. Note that if H0 is accepted under ϕˆn when the defender
observes xn, then we have ∫
q(xn)σˆAn (dq)
p(xn)
≤ γ
(note that there could be randomization when equality holds above). By Proposition 4.1, notice that (σˆAn , ϕˆn)
is a Nash equilibrium, and en(q, σˆDn ) = en(q, ϕˆn) for all q ∈ Q. Therefore it suffices to show that
supq∈Q en(q, ϕˆn)→ 0 as n→∞.
Note that, the acceptance region of H0 under the decision rule ϕˆn is type-based, i.e., for every n-length word
xn, ϕˆn(xn) depends only on Pxn . Therefore, if H0 is accepted when the defender observes xn, the type Pxn
must belong to the following subset of M1(X ):{
Pxn : log
∫
q(xn)
p(xn)
σˆAn (dq) ≤ log γ
}
.
Define
Γn =
{
Pxn :
∫
log
(
q(xn)
p(xn)
)
σˆAn (dq) ≤ log γ
}
.
Notice that, by Jensen’s inequality, the acceptance region of H0 under the decision rule ϕˆn is a subset of the
above set Γn. Also, it is easy to check that,
Γn = {µ ∈M1(X ) : D(µ||p)−
∫
D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq) ≤ log γ
n
} ∩ Pn.
We now show that the set Γn does not intersect the set Q for large enough n. First, notice that, the set
{µ ∈M1(X ) : D(µ||p) ≤ D(µ||q∗)} is closed in M1(X ). Therefore, by Assumption (A4), there exists η > 0
such thatQη∩{µ ∈M1(X ) : D(µ||p) ≤ D(µ||q∗)} = ∅, whereQη = {µ ∈M1(X ) : infq∈Q ||µ−q|| ≤ η}
is the η-expansion of the set Q.
We show that there existsN ≥ 1 such thatQη∩Γn = ∅ for all n ≥ N . Suppose not, then we can find a sequence
(µn)n≥1 such that µn ∈ Qη and µn ∈ Γn for all n ≥ 1. Since Qη is compact, we can find a subsequence
(nk)k≥1 along which µn converges, and let µ = limk→∞ µnk ∈ Qη. Since µn ∈ Γn for all n ≥ 1, using
Lemma B.1, we see that µ satisfies D(µ||p) ≤ D(µ||q∗). This contradicts the fact that Qη ∩ Γn = ∅, and
hence, there exists N ≥ 1 such that Qη ∩ Γn = ∅ for all n ≥ N .
By the law of large numbers, we have
sup
q∈Q
q(Pxn /∈ B(q, η))→ 0,
and
p(Pxn /∈ Γn)→ 0
as n→∞. But, notice that
en(q, ϕˆn) ≤ q(Pxn ∈ Γn) + γp(Pxn /∈ Γn)
≤ q(Pxn /∈ B(q, η)) + γp(Pxn /∈ Γn)
for all q ∈ Q and n ≥ N . Therefore,
sup
q∈Q
en(q, ϕˆn) ≤ sup
q∈Q
q(Pxn /∈ B(q, η)) + γp(Pxn /∈ Γn)
→ 0
as n→∞.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Fix ε > 0. By Lemma 4.4, there exists Nε such that
en(qn, σˆ
D
n ) ≤ ε
for all n ≥ Nε. Therefore,
uAn (qn, σˆ
D
n ) ≤ ε− c(qn)
for all n ≥ Nε. However, by playing the pure strategy q∗, the attacker utility is
uAn (q
∗, σˆDn ) ≥ −c(q∗)
for all n ≥ 1. Since (σˆAn , σˆDn ) is a Nash equilibrium, and since qn ∈ supp(σˆAn ), we must have uAn (qn, σˆDn ) ≥
uAn (q
∗, σˆDn ) for all n ≥ Nε. That is,
c(qn) ≤ c(q) + ε
for all n ≥ Nε. Thus, it follows that, c(qn) → c(q∗) as n → ∞. Using the definition of q∗, we see that
qn → q∗ as n→∞.
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B.7 Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, we obtain the asymptotic lower bound. Towards this, we shall consider an equivalent zero-sum game for
GB(d, n). For q ∈ Q and ϕ ∈ Φn, define
ueqn (q, ϕ) =
∑
xn
(1− ϕ(xn))q(xn) + γ
∑
xn
ϕ(xn)p(xn)− c(q).
Observe that, as far as the attacker is concerned, for any ϕ ∈ Φn, maximizing uAn (·, ϕ) is the same as maximizing
ueqn (·, ϕ), as the extra term present in ueqn does not depend on the attacker strategy. Similarly, for any q ∈ Q,
maximizing the defender’s utility function uDn (q, ·) is the same as minimizing ueqn (q, ·), as the cost function c
does not depend on the defender’s strategy. Therefore, we see that GB(d, n) is best-response equivalent to a
two-player zero sum game (with attacker being first player and defender being second player) with the above
utility for the first player. Hence, any equilibrium for the original game is also going to be an equilibrium for the
zero-sum equivalent game with utility function ueqn (see Definition 4 in [12] and the remarks before Theorem 2).
Consider the strategy profile (q∗, σˆDn ), i.e., the attacker plays the pure strategy q∗ and the defender plays the
mixed strategy σˆDn that comes from the equilibrium. By definition of the Nash equilibrium, and the equivalence
of GB(d, n) with the above zero-sum game, we have
ueqn (σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) ≥ ueqn (q∗, σˆDn ). (B.3)
(ueqn (σˆAn , σˆDn ) denotes the utility in mixed extension of the equivalent zero-sum game).
Define the deterministic decision rule ϕ∗n by
ϕ∗n(x
n) =
{
1, if q
∗(xn)
p(xn)
≥ γ,
0, otherwise.
It is easy to see that ϕ∗n minimizes en(q∗, ·). Writing the probabilities p(xn) and q(xn) in terms of Pxn , it is
easy to check that, the acceptance region of ϕ∗n is given by
Γ∗n = {ν ∈M1(X ) ∩ Pn : D(ν||q∗)−D(ν||p) > log γ
n
},
i.e., ϕ∗n(xn) = 0 whenever Pxn ∈ Γ∗n, and ϕ∗n(xn) = 1 otherwise. Noting that ueqn (q, ϕ) = en(q, ϕ)− c(q),
(B.3) becomes
en(σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) ≥
∫ ∑
xn
((1− ϕ(xn))q∗(xn) + γϕ(xn)p(xn)) σˆDn (dϕ)− c(q∗) +
∫
c(q)σˆAn (dq)
≥
∫ ∑
xn
((1− ϕ(xn))q∗(xn) + γϕ(xn)p(xn)) σˆDn (dϕ)
≥
∑
xn
((1− ϕ∗n(xn))q∗(xn) + γϕ∗n(xn)p(xn)) , (B.4)
where the second inequality follows from the definition of q∗, and the last inequality follows from the optimality
of ϕ∗n. The quantitiy in the RHS of the last inequality is the minimum Bayesian error for the following standard
binary hypothesis testing problem: under the null hypothesis, each symbol in xn is generated independently
from p, and under the alternate hypothesis, each symbol is generated independently from q∗. It is well known
that (see, for example, Corollary 3.4.6 in [10]),
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log en(q
∗, ϕ∗n) ≥ −Λ∗0(0),
and hence, from (B.3) and (B.4), it follows that,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) ≥ −Λ∗0(0). (B.5)
We now proceed to show the upper bound. Define the decision rule ϕ′n by
ϕ′n(x
n) =
{
1, if q
∗(xn)
p(xn)
≥ 1,
0, otherwise.
Similar to the decision rule ϕ∗n, the acceptance region of ϕ′n can be written as
Γ′ = {ν ∈M1(X ) : D(ν||q∗)−D(ν||p) > 0},
i.e., ϕ′n(xn) = 0 if Pxn ∈ Γ′, and ϕ′n(xn) = 1 otherwise. By the definition of a Nash equilibrium, and noting
that uDn (σˆAn , σˆDn ) = −en(σˆAn , σˆDn ), we have
en(σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) ≤ en(σˆAn , ϕ′n), (B.6)
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where (σˆAn , ϕ′n) denotes the strategy profile where the attacker plays the mixed strategy σˆAn that comes form the
equilibrium, and the defender plays the pure strategy ϕ′n. We have,
en(σˆ
A
n , ϕ
′
n) =
∫ ∑
xn
(
(1− ϕ′n(xn))q(xn) + γϕ′n(xn)p(xn)
)
σAn (dq)
=
∫
q(Pxn ∈ Γ′)σˆAn (dq) + p(Pxn ∈ (Γ′)c).
Consider the first term. Using the upper bound on the probability of observing a type under a given distribution
(Lemma 2.1.9 in [10]), we have
q(Pxn ∈ Γ′) ≤ (n+ 1)de−n infν∈Γ′ D(ν||q).
Fix ε > 0. Since the relative entropy is jointly uniformly continuous on Γ′ ×Q, there exists a δ > 0 such that
D(ν||q) ≥ D(ν||q∗)− ε
for all ν ∈ Γ′ whenever ||q−q∗||2 < δ. For the above δ, by Lemma 4.5, there existsNδ such that ||q−q∗||2 < δ
whenever q ∈ supp(σˆAn ) for all n ≥ Nδ . Therefore, we see that, for all n ≥ Nδ and ν ∈ Γ′,
D(ν||q) ≥ D(ν||q∗)− ε for all q ∈ supp(σˆAn ).
Therefore, for all n ≥ Nδ , we have
q(Pxn ∈ Γ′) ≤ (n+ 1)de−n(infν∈Γ′ D(ν||q
∗)−ε)
for all q ∈ supp(σˆAn ). For the second term, using Lemma 2.1.9 in [10], we have
p(Pxn ∈ (Γ′)c) ≤ e−n infν∈(Γ′)c D(ν||p).
It can be easily shown that (for example, see Exercise 3.4.14(b) in [10]), infν∈Γ′ D(ν||q∗) =
infν∈(Γ′)c D(ν||p) = Λ∗0(0). Hence, the above implies that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , ϕ
′
n) ≤ −Λ∗0(0) + ε.
Letting ε→ 0, we get
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , ϕ
′
n) ≤ −Λ∗0(0).
Therefore, from (B.6) and the above inequality, we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) ≤ −Λ∗0(0). (B.7)
The theorem now follows from (B.5) and (B.7).
B.8 Proof of Lemma A.1
We show sequential compactness of Φn. Let (ϕk)k≥1 be a sequence in Φn. Let xn1 , . . . ,xn2n denote the elements
of Xn. Since ϕn(xn) ∈ [0, 1] for all xn ∈ Xn, there exists a subsequence (k(1)l )l≥1 along which ϕ(xn1 )
converges. We can then extract a further subsequence (k(2)l )l≥1 of (k
(1)
l )l≥1 along which ϕ(x
n
2 ) converges.
Repeating the above procedure 2n times, we see that, there exists a subsequence (kl)l≥1 along which ϕ(xn)
converges for all xn ∈ Xn. Put
ϕ(xn) = lim
l→∞
ϕkl(x
n), xn ∈ Xn.
It is clear that dn(ϕkl , ϕ)→ 0 as l→∞, and we have
PFAn (ϕ) =
∑
xn
ϕ(xn)p(xn)
=
∑
xn
lim
l→∞
(ϕkl(x
n))p(xn)
= lim
l→∞
∑
xn
ϕkl(x
n)p(xn)
= lim
l→∞
PFA(ϕkl)
≤ ε,
since PFA(ϕkl) ≤ ε for all l ≥ 1. This shows that the space Φn equipped with the metric dn is sequentially
compact, and hence compact.
17
B.9 Proof of Proposition A.1
By Lemma A.1, the strategy space of the defender is compact. Also, the strategy space of the attacker is compact
under the standard Euclidean topology on Rd. By Lemma A.2, we see that the utility functions of both players
are jointly continuous. Therefore, by the Glicksberg fixed point theorem (see, for example, Corollary 2.4.
in [26]), there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the game G(ε, d, n).
We now show the structure of the equilibrium strategy of the defender. Let (σˆAn , σˆDn ) denote a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium of G(ε, d, n). By the property of Nash equilibrium, we have that en(σˆAn , ϕ) = en(σˆAn , σˆDn )
for all ϕ ∈ supp(σˆDn ). We claim that PFA(ϕ) = ε for all ϕ ∈ supp(σˆDn ). If there exists ϕ ∈ supp(σˆDn )
with PFA(ϕ) < ε, then we can find xn0 ∈ Xn such that ϕ(xn0 ) = 0 and δ > 0 such that the decision rule
defined by ϕ′(xn) = ϕ(xn) for all xn 6= xn0 , and ϕ′(xn0 ) = δ has the property that PFAn (ϕ′) ≤ ε and
en(σˆ
A
n , ϕ
′) < en(σˆAn , σˆ
D
n ). This contradicts the fact that, (σˆAn , σˆDn ) is a Nash equilibrium, which proves our
claim.
But, note that
en(σˆ
A
n , σˆ
D
n ) =
∫ ∑
xn
(1− ϕ(xn))q(xn)σˆAn (dq)σˆDn (dϕ)
=
∑
xn
[∫
(1− ϕ(xn))q(xn)σˆAn (dq)σˆDn (dϕ)
]
=
∑
xn
[∫
(1− ϕ(xn))qσˆAn (x
n))σˆDn (dϕ)
]
where qσˆAn ∈M1(X
n) is given by
qσˆAn (x
n) =
∫
q(xn)σˆAn (dq).
That is, when the attacker plays the Nash equilibrium σˆAn , the defender faces the problem of distinguishing
between the two alternatives: (i) (X1, . . . , Xn) is generated by i.i.d. p, versus (ii) (X1, . . . , Xn) is generated
by qσˆAn . By the Neyman-Pearson lemma, we know that there exists a Neyman-Pearson decision rule ϕˆn ∈ Φn
with the property that PFA(ϕˆn) = ε and en(σˆAn , ·) is minimized by ϕˆn on Φn. Since every ϕ ∈ supp(σˆDn )
minimizes en(σˆAn , ·), and PFA(ϕ) = ε, and since each xn ∈ Xn has positive probability of observing under
both H0 and H1, an application of the uniqueness part in Neyman-Pearson lemma (see, for example, Section 5.1
in [13]) yields that that σˆDn = δϕˆn . This completes the proof.
B.10 Proof of Lemma A.3
Recall the definition of a Neyman-Pearson decision rule. In the binary case, since the comparison of the ratio
q(xn)
p(xn)
to a threshold is the same as comparison of the number of 1’s in the n-length word xn to some other
threshold, we see that any Neyman-Pearson decision rule ϕ must necessarily be of the following form:
ϕ(xn) =
 0, if Px
n(1) ∈ {0, 1
n
, . . . , k
n
},
pi, if Pxn(1) = k+1n ,
1, if Pxn(1) ∈ { k+2n , . . . , 1},
(B.8)
for some pi ∈ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ k ≤ n. Here, Pxn(1) denotes the fraction of 1’s in xn. The false alarm probability
of the above decision rule is
PFAn (ϕ) = p
(
Pxn(1) ∈ {0, 1
n
, . . . ,
k
n
}
)
+ pip
(
Pxn(1) = k + 1
n
)
.
Since every n-length word xn has positive probability under the distribution p, we see that, there exists a
unique k and pi such that PFAn (ϕ) = ε. Let ϕˆn denote the above Neyman-Pearson decision rule. Then, by the
Neyman-Pearson lemma (see, for example, Proposition II.D.1 in [25]), we see that,
ϕˆn = arg max
ϕ∈Φn
uDn (q, ϕ) for all q ∈ Q.
Thus, the defender has a unique strictly dominant strategy. Using the continuity of c, and the continuity of the
Type II error term in the attacker’s strategy, we see that uAn (·, ϕˆn) is continuous on Q, and hence there exist
a maximum. Therefore, letting the attacker play a pure strategy qˆn that maximizes uAn (·, ϕˆn) yields a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (qˆn, ϕˆn).
To prove Lemma A.6, we need the following lemma, which can be proved similar to Lemma B.1.
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Lemma B.2. Let (σˆAn , ϕˆn)n≥1 be as in Lemma A.4. Then,
sup
µ∈M1(X )
∣∣∣∣∫ D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq)−D(µ||q∗)∣∣∣∣→ 0 as n→∞.
B.11 Proof of Lemma A.6
Let γn denote the threshold and pi denote the randomization used in the decision rule ϕˆn, i.e., ϕˆn is of the form
ϕˆn(x
n) =

1, if
q
σˆAn
(xn)
p(xn)
> γn,
pi, if
q
σˆAn
(xn)
p(xn)
= γn,
0, if
q
σˆAn
(xn)
p(xn)
< γn.
We first claim that lim supn→∞ γn ≤ 1. Since PFA(ϕˆn) = ε, we have that
p
(
qσˆAn (x
n)
p(xn)
≥ γn
)
≥ ε (B.9)
But, using the probability of observing an n-length word under a distribution (see, for example, Lemma 2.1.6
in [10]), we have
qσˆAn (xn) =
∫
q(xn)σˆAn (dq)
=
∫
e−n(H(Pxn )+D(Pxn ||q))σˆAn (dq),
and
p(xn) = e−n(H(Pxn )+D(Pxn )||p).
Therefore,
p
(
qσˆAn (x
n)
p(xn)
≥ γn
)
= p
(∫
en(D(Pxn ||p)−D(Pxn ||q)) ≥ γn
)
≤ p
(
en(D(Pxn ||p)−infq∈QD(Pxn ||q)) ≥ γn
)
By Assumption (A1), we can choose δ > 0 such that D(µ||p) < infq∈QD(µ||q) for all µ ∈ B(p, δ). Thus,
p
(
en(D(Pxn ||p)−infq∈QD(Pxn ||q)) ≥ γn
)
= p
(
en(D(Pxn ||p)−infq∈QD(Pxn ||q)) ≥ γn,Pxn ∈ B(p, δ)
)
+ p
(
en(D(Pxn ||p)−infq∈QD(Pxn ||q)) ≥ γn,Pxn /∈ B(p, δ)
)
By law of large numbers, p(Pxn /∈ B(p, δ)) → 0, and hence the second term above goes to 0 as n → ∞.
Suppose that lim supn→∞ γn > 1, then there exists a subsequence (nk)k≥1 such that γnk > 1 for all k ≥ 1.
Therefore, along this subsequence, the first term above becomes
p(enk(D(Pxnk ||p)−infq∈QD(Pxnk ||q)) ≥ γnk ,Pxnk ∈ B(p, δ))
≤ p(en(D(Pxnk ||p)−infq∈QD(Pxnk ||q)) > 1,Pxnk ∈ B(p, δ))
which goes to 0 as n→∞ by the choice of δ. This implies that, p
(
q
σˆAn
(xn)
p(xn)
≥ γn
)
→ 0 as n→∞, which
contradicts (B.9). Therefore, we must have lim supn→∞ γn ≤ 1.
We now argue that, for some η > 0, the acceptance set of H0 under ϕˆn does not intersect the set Qη . Towards
this, consider the set
Γn =
{
Pxn :
∫
log
(
q(xn)
p(xn)
)
σˆAn (dq) ≤ log γn
}
.
Notice that, by Jensen’s inequality, the acceptance region of H0 under the decision rule ϕˆn is a subset of the
above set Γn. Also, it is easy to check that,
Γn = {µ ∈M1(X ) : D(µ||p)−
∫
D(µ||q)σˆAn (dq) ≤ log γn
n
} ∩ Pn.
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We now show that the set Γn does not intersect the set Q for large enough n. First, notice that, the set
{µ ∈M1(X ) : D(µ||p) ≤ D(µ||q∗)} is closed in M1(X ). Therefore,by Assumption (A4) there exists η > 0
such that {µ ∈M1(X ) : D(µ||p) ≤ D(µ||q∗)} ∩Qη = ∅.
We show that there exists N ≥ 1 such that Qη ∩ Γn = ∅ for all n ≥ N . Suppose not, then we can find
a sequence (µn)n≥1 such that µn ∈ Qη and µn ∈ Γn for all n ≥ 1. Since Qη is compact, we can find a
subsequence (nk)k≥1 along which µn converges, and let µ = limk→∞ µnk ∈ Qη. Since µn ∈ Γn for all
n ≥ 1, using Lemma B.2 and the fact that lim supn→∞ γn = 0, we see that µ satisfies D(µ||p) ≤ D(µ||q∗).
This contradicts the fact that Qη ∩ Γn = ∅, and hence, there exists N ≥ 1 such that Qη ∩ Γn = ∅ for all
n ≥ N .
By the law of large numbers, we have
sup
q∈Q
q(Pxn /∈ B(q, η))→ 0
as n→∞. But, notice that
en(q, ϕˆn) ≤ q(Pxn ∈ Γn)
≤ q(Pxn /∈ B(q, η))
for all q ∈ Q and n ≥ N . Therefore,
sup
q∈Q
en(q, ϕˆn) ≤ sup
q∈Q
q(Pxn /∈ B(q, η))→ 0
as n→∞.
B.12 Proof of Theorem A.1
We proceed through similar steps as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. To show the lower bound, we let the attacker play
the pure strategy q∗ instead of the her equilibrium strategy σˆAn for all n ≥ 1. Since uAn (q, ϕ) = en(q, ϕ)− c(q),
and since (σˆAn , ϕˆn) is a Nash equilibrium for GNP (ε, d, n), we see that
en(σˆ
A
n , ϕˆn) ≥ en(q∗, ϕˆn)− c(q∗) +
∫
c(q)σˆAn (dq)
≥ en(q∗, ϕˆn)
≥ en(q∗, ϕ∗n)
where ϕ∗n denotes the best ε-level Neyman-Pearson test for distinguishing p from q∗ from n independent samples.
Here, the second inequality follows from the definition of q∗, and the last inequallity follows from the optimality
of Neyman-Pearson test ϕ∗n. Hence, using Stein’s lemma (see, for example, Lemma 3.4.7 in [10]), we see that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , ϕˆn) ≥ −D(p||q∗). (B.10)
We now show the upper bound. Fix 0 < δ < 1 such that B(p, δ) ∩ Q = ∅, and consider the deterministic
decision rule ϕδ with acceptance region B(p, δ), i.e., ϕδ(xn) = 0 whenever Pxn ∈ B(p, δ) and ϕδ(xn) = 1
otherwise. To obtain the upper bound, we let the defender play the strategy ϕδn for all n ≥ 1. Since (σˆAn , ϕˆn) is
a Nash equilibrium, and uDn (q, ϕ) = −en(q, ϕ), we have
en(σˆ
A
n , ϕˆn) ≤ en(σˆAn , ϕδ)
=
∫
q(Pxn ∈ Γδ)σˆAn (dq)
≤
∫
(n+ 1)de−n infν∈Γδ D(ν||q)σˆAn (dq), (B.11)
where the last inequality follows form the upper bound in Lemma 2.1.9 in [10]. By Lemma A.7 and by the
uniform continuity of D(·||·) on Γδ ×Q, there exists Nδ ≥ 1 such that
D(ν||q) ≥ D(ν||q∗)− δ for all ν ∈ Γδ, q ∈ supp(σˆAn ) and n ≥ Nδ.
Therefore, (B.11) implies that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , ϕˆn) ≤ − inf
ν∈Γδ
D(ν||q∗) + δ.
Letting δ → 0 and using the continuity of D(·||q∗) on M1(X ), we get
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log en(σˆ
A
n , ϕˆn) ≤ −D(p||q∗). (B.12)
The result now follows form (B.10) and (B.12).
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(a) n = 200 (b) n = 250
Figure 2: Best response plots for c(q) = |q − 0.8|
(a) c(q) = |q− 0.8|, n = 250, defender plays threshold
166
(b) c(q) = (q − 0.8)2, n = 800, defender plays thresh-
old 529
Figure 3: Finer plots of attacker revenue around q∗ for specific defender thresholds
C Additional Numerical Experiments
C.1 Bayesian Formulation
As explained in Section 5, we fix X = {0, 1} and p = 0.5. For numerical computations, we discretize the set
Q into 100 equally spaced points, and we only consider deterministic threshold-based decision rules for the
defender.
We first examine the best response of the players. We fixQ = [0.7, 0.9] and the cost function to be c(q) = |q−q∗|
where q∗ = 0.8. Figure 2(a) shows the best response of the players for n = 200. The x-axis shows the strategy
space of the attacker and y-axis shows the defender’s threshold. The blue curve plots the best response of the
defender, and the red curve plots the best response of the attacker for 20 thresholds around the best response
threshold corresponding to q∗. As we see from the figure, the two curves do not intersect (the best threshold for
0.8 is 133, whereas the best value of q for threshold 133 is 0.7) and hence this suggests that there is no pure
strategy equilibrium in this case. Figure 2(b) plots the best response curves for n = 250. We see that the two
curves intersect (the point of intersection is when the attacker plays 0.8 and the defender plays the threshold
166). However, this does not mean that there is a pure equilibrium, as our discretization may not capture the
exact value of the attacker strategy. To see whether this is the case, we plot the attacker revenue when the
defender plays the threshold 166 over a finer grid around q∗ (1000 equally sized points on the interval of length
1/(100 ∗ n) around q∗), which is shown in Figure 3(a). From this, we observe that the maximum of the attacker
utility is indeed attained at the point q = 0.8. This suggests that there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when
the attacker plays 0.8 and defender plays the threshold 166, though we could not prove this analytically.
Similar to the best response plots in Figure 2, we plot the best response plots for the quadratic cost function
c(q) = (q − q∗)2 where q∗ = 0.8. Figure 4(a) shows the best response plots for n = 700. Here, they don’t
intersect (the best threshold for 0.8 is 463 whereas the best value of q for threshold 463 is 0.7), which shows
that there is no pure equilibrium for the game. Figure 4(b) shows the best repose plots for n = 800. Here, we
see that the curves intersect (when the attacker plays 0.8 and defender plays the threshold 529). As before,
Figure 3(b) shows a finer plot of the utility of the attacker around the point q∗. We see that the utility of the
attacker is indeed maximized at 0.8, which suggests that there is a pure strategy equilibrium when the attacker
plays the strategy 0.8 and defender plays the threshold 529.
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(a) n = 700 (b) n = 800
Figure 4: Best response plots for the cost function c(q) = (q − 0.8)2
(a) c(q) = 2|q − 0.9| (b) c(q) = (q − 0.9)2
Figure 5: Error exponents as a function of n
From these experiments for the linear as well as quadratic cost functions, as we expect, there is no incentive for
the attacker to deviate much form the point q∗, since for large values of n, the error term in the utility of the
attacker does not contribute to the overall revenue. However, in the second case, since the cost function has zero
derivative at q∗, it is not clear whether a slight deviation form the point q∗ can increase the error term compared
to the decrease in the cost function, so that the overall utility of the attacker increases. Therefore, the existence of
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with the attacker strategy being equal to q∗ is surprising in this case. However,
in the first case, since the left and right derivatives of the cost function at q∗ are non-zero, the decease in the cost
function is much larger compared to the possible increase in the error term as we slightly deviate from q∗, and
hence it is reasonable to expect the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium at q∗ for large n.
Comparing the two cost functions, a much higher value of n is needed in the second case for us to have a pure
equilibrium at q∗, since the increase in the cost function is much slower in the second case as we move away
from the point q∗.
We now give two more examples that does not satisfy Assumption (A4) whose error exponents are different from
Theorem 4.1. As before, Q = [0.6, 0.9] and q∗ = 0.9, and recall that Assumption (A4) is not satisfied in this
case. We consider the linear cost function c(q) = 2|q − q∗| and the quadratic cost function c(q) = (q − q∗)2.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the error exponent at the equilibrium as a function of n, from n = 100 to n = 400
in steps of 100. From these plots, we see that, the error exponents converge to somewhere around 0.023 and
0.011 respectively for the above two cost functions, whereas the value of Λ∗0(0) is around 0.111.
C.2 Neyman-Pearson Formulation
We fix ε = 0.1 and consider the piecewise linear cost function c(q) = |q − q∗| on Q = [0.7, 0.8] where
q∗ = 0.8. As suggested by Lemma A.3, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for GNP (ε, 2, n) for
each n ≥ 1. We first compute the dominant decision rule of the defender by finding the appropriate value of
threshold and randomization. Once this is done, we compute the equilibrium by finding the best response of the
attacker corresponding to this dominant strategy of the defender (as before, we discretize the set Q into 100
equally-spaced points). We repeat the experiment for different values of n, and for the quadratic cost function
c(q) = 0.001 ∗ (q − 0.8)2. Figure 6 and Figure 7 shows the results for the above two cost functions.
22
(a) Attacker’s strategy as a function of n (b) Error exponent as a function of n
Figure 6: c(q) = |q − 0.8|
(a) Attacker’s strategy as a function of n (b) Error exponent as a function of n
Figure 7: c(q) = 0.001 ∗ (q − 0.8)2
Since the former cost function increases much faster than the latter as we move away from the point q∗, we see
that the attacker has much more incentive to play a strategy that is away from q∗ in the second case compared to
the first. This is reflected in the equilibrium strategy of the attacker; from Figures 6(a) and 7(a), we see that it
takes much larger values of n for the equilibrium strategy of the attacker to become equal to q∗ in the second
case compared to the first. From Figures 6(b) and 7(b), we see that the error exponents approach the limiting
value D(p||q∗) = 0.223.
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